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What are the examples of hostile vehicle mitigation?

Author: Geoff

Apr. 29, 2024

84 0 0

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) - NPSA

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation puts a protective barrier around your site protecting you, your people and your infrastructure.

If you want to learn more, please visit our website Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Equipment.

Vehicle borne threats range from vandalism to sophisticated or aggressive attack by terrorists or determined criminals. Vehicles (such as cars, vans and lorries) are widely available and terrorists have previously gained access to them through a number of means:

During a terrorist attack, the driver is unlikely to comply with the rules of the road. They will:

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)

An improvised explosive device is either visible or concealed within a vehicle and transported to target.

The effects from a VBIED detonation include the blast, fireball, primary & secondary fragmentation and ground shock.  

The blast stand-off (the distance between the device and the asset) is the most important factor in determining the extent of damage that can be caused. Maximising the blast stand-off distance will reduce the damage sustained to the asset.

Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW)

Deliberately driving a vehicle:

  • at an individual or into crowds of people to cause harm; or
  • deliberately driving a vehicle into infrastructure to damage or disrupt its operation. This may indirectly lead to harm to people or disruption to the operation of  a site/event, or more widely, critical services or supplies.

Driving a vehicle into crowds is regarded by terrorists as attractive because it is likely to cause multiple casualties, is low complexity, affordable, requires little planning and skill and is perceived as less likely to be detected in the planning phase. 

VAW attacks are frequently the first part of a Layered Attack. The attacks frequently begin on public roads with little or no warning and are often followed by a marauding attack using bladed weapons, firearms or fire as a weapon. 

Layered Attack Vehicle - transporting attackers and / or weapons 

A layered attack is a combination of attack types.

The vehicle may:

  • facilitate the delivery of armed attackers, either covertly or overtly; or
  • be combined with a VBIED or VAW attack

There are seven exploits terrorists will use to overcome operational and/or physical security measures

Hostile vehicle mitigation

HVM bollards enforcing a vehicle control zone in Manchester's pedestrianised city centre.

Hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) is a generic term that covers a suite of anti-terrorist protective measures that are often employed around buildings or publicly accessible spaces/venues of particular significance.[1][2] The design of these various vehicle security barriers and landscape treatments came about as security authorities across the globe sought to mitigate the effects of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED)[3] and vehicle-ramming attacks. The sorts of places that warrant consideration as potential terrorist targets in need of HVM include: government buildings, airports, large railway stations, sports venues, concentrations of entertainment and crowded night time economy, etc.[4][5]

Usage

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Common types of HVM include locally manufactured barrier systems such as the Jersey Barrier and Bremer T Wall; as well as propriety crash-tested and engineered vehicle bollard systems designed to resist the effects of a vehicle ram attack.[6] HVM can also include adapted hard landscape features, resistive street furniture, sculpture, planters and significant level changes; with a little imagination HVM may be disguised inside architectural features in a street scene.[7][8]

HVM when installed and fixed correctly is designed to resist hostile vehicle penetration of certain categories of vehicle moving at a range of speeds,[9] these vehicle security barriers undergo various destructive tests carried out by accredited test establishments.[10][11] The three standards that are generally quoted when specifying HVM performance are:

  • ISO IWA 14-1 - an international working agreement[12]
  • BSI PAS 68 - the UK standard[13]
  • ASTM F2656-07 - the US standard.[14]

These standards set roughly similar criteria for destructive impact testing, although there are differences between the three and vehicle geometries in particular are at the root of some of these differences. HVM barrier selection will be conditioned by a hostile vehicle dynamics study carried out by a suitably qualified security specialist.[15]

Concrete blocks placed to protect the Terminal 3 at Manchester Airport from hostile vehicle attack; these have now been replaced by more attractive bollardsSecurity measures taken to protect the Houses of Parliament in London, UK. This hostile vehicle mitigation is a common form of target hardening and is designed to prevent a vehicle being rammed into the building or into people on the pavement next to the building. It also enforces a zone of protective stand-off from any explosive detonation location

Ideally a protective layer of HVM should surround the building or place being protected and this HVM protection line should be stood off from the building facade or places expected to be crowded. This protective standoff distance is critical in the case of VBIEDs as 'every metre counts' and often distance is one of the best ways to achieve explosive blast effects mitigation.[16][17]

The ARSENAL lettering in the foreground of the Emirates Stadium is an example of disguised HVM

More recently the focus of HVM has expanded to reduce the potential for vehicle ram attacks directed at crowded events and places.[18] Recent non-VBIED (i.e. vehicle as a weapon) attacks against pedestrians include:

HVM can also be used to protect against ram raids which are invariably criminal attacks against high net-worth targets such as jewelers, cash and valuables in transit depots, bullion storage facilities, art galleries, museums, high-end fashion stores, etc.[19]

Correctly installed HVM barrier systems should not adversely affect pedestrian permeability.[20]

See also

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